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Abstract
We analyze the e¤ects of labor migration ows on income taxation
between two countries (regions) di¤ering by the size of their population
and the level of productive e¢ ciencies. Residents, otherwise identical, are
heterogeneous because they incur di¤erent migration costs. Each resident
compares the post-tax amount of money at home with the one obtained
abroad, including the cost of migration. The government in each coun-
try maximizes the tax receipt in order to provide the largest possible
amount of public good. We prove the existence of an equilibrium for any
conguration of wage and any di¤erent relative size of the countries (re-
gions). Then, we compute and characterize the equilibrium for any set
of parameters, size and wage di¤erential. Finally, we show how equilib-
rium migration ows a¤ect the level of income taxation in the origin and
destination country.
KEY words: migration, income tax, scal competition
JEL classication: F22, H20.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze the e¤ect of labor mobility on optimal taxation, in
a two-country setup. Countries have di¤erent population sizes and di¤erent
productive e¢ ciencies.
In the past two decades, the removal of political and economic barriers among
countries in the European Union has set in motion an increasing mobility of
factors of production, including labor. As a consequence, a large body of lit-
erature has ourished analyzing the main drivers of international migration,
thereby identifying di¤erent redistributive policies of governmentsmembers of
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the Union to which migrants are highly sensitive1 . The idea that individuals
decide where to live by comparing net income levels in their origin country
with those of potential destination countries is now commonly accepted in the
theoretical literature and validated by many empirical papers. A natural com-
panion question concerns the impact of migrations on optimal taxes. As early
as 1972, Oates (1972) argued that international factor mobility, combined with
tax competition among countries, might lead to a "race-to-the-bottom": in or-
der to attract mobile factors or prevent them to y away, governments reduce
tax rates with potential negative e¤ects on welfare-state benets due to the re-
sulting narrowed State budget. These negative e¤ects are particularly sensitive
in the relatively high tax country, the tax base shrinking due to the migrants
movement to the relatively low tax country.2
Recent advances in this eld show that, in some circumstances, the above
statements do not hold. For example, when accounting for the heterogeneity
of migrants, namely unskilled versus skilled workers, one could observe higher
taxes under scal competition than in the alternative case of coordination among
countries. Typically, when high productivity-capital rich countries provide large
welfare-state benets, then unskilled migrants can be attracted to these coun-
tries. As a consequence, higher redistributive taxes need to be implemented in
these destination countries (Razin, 2012). This increase in the scal burden on
native-born citizens induced by the arrival of migrants can explain why liberaliz-
ing migration is not as easy to be coordinated among countries as international
trade agreements.
Other elements can also a¤ect the race-to-the bottom process, with strong
scal policy implications. In 2004, there was the accession of eight new member
states from Central and Eastern Europe, followed in 2007 by Bulgaria and Ro-
mania. As the EU is still expanding to include possibly other countries (such
as Turkey), one may wonder whether further asymmetries among countries can
play a role in scal competition. In particular, asymmetries in population size or
productivity should also be expected to play an important role in the interaction
among national scal mechanisms. For instance, concerning size asymmetry be-
tween countries, it has been pointed out that a smaller country is expected to
be more aggressive than a larger rival when competing in taxes: the former
has less revenue to loose if some of its native citizens y away, while gaining
possibly a larger tax base from lowering the tax more than the rival does. Still,
the argument is no longer as simple if country size asymmetry is combined with
productivity asymmetry.
In order to disentangle the inuences of both size asymmetries and pro-
ductivity discrepancies between countries, a model is needed to capture how
income taxes and migration ows are interrelated "at equilibrium" under such
1See, for instance, Wildasin (1988, 1991, 2006), Myers (1990), Epple and Romer (1991),
Wellisch (2000), Hansen and Kessler (2001), Piaser (2003), Puy (2003) among others.
2Hamilton and Pestieau (2005), Simula and Trannoy (2010) are two of the existing papers
that analyze the role of migration in scal competition depending on the type of migrants,
namely skilled vsus unskilled workers.
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asymmetries.
To this end, we provide hereafter a two country model with asymmetric pro-
ductive e¢ ciencies and di¤erent population sizes. In spite of incurring a positive
migration cost, individuals may freely want to move from a country to another:
while a higher gross wage abroad plays as a powerful attractor for migrants, a
larger tax pressure on the contrary operates as a strong repellent. Hence, each
resident compares the post- tax amount of money obtained at home with the one
obtained abroad, including the cost to be incurred due to migration.3 Further,
individuals in each country are heterogeneous according to their attachment to
the home country: as a result, the cost of moving abroad is heterogeneous across
the population of residents. Some of them are strongly linked to their relatives
living in their home country while others are considerably more mobile, simply
because they are less attached to the people living around them. National tra-
ditions, patriotism, historical origins and meteorological conditions4 constitute
other values to be considered, with a varying inuence across citizens of a given
country. Accordingly, individuals placed otherwise in similar situations appear
as heterogeneous in their willingness to move abroad to nd better conditions
in their economic environment. The government in each country maximizes the
tax revenue. Countries are assumed to play a two stage game. In the rst stage,
each government is assumed to set its income tax, taking into consideration
the possible migration ow initiated as a consequence of its scal pressure. In
the second stage, residents in each country decide whether to stay in their own
country or to migrate, thereby a¤ecting the tax base both in their origin, and
in the destination, country.
In order to clearly identify the inuence of each asymmetry (size and pro-
ductivity) on equilibrium, we start by nding this equilibrium in a framework
where countries only di¤er in size while sharing the same productive e¢ ciency.
Hereafter we call this framework the benchmark. Then, we develop the game
while accounting simultaneously for both sources of asymmetry, namely rela-
tive size and productivity. This analysis embodies all possible combinations of
asymmetries, with a higher productive e¢ ciency (or wage) in the larger country
or, alternatively, in the smaller one, and identies the corresponding equilibrium
in each country.
Our ndings are as follows. In the benchmark case, without any productivity
asymmetry but di¤erent size, the unique equilibrium of the tax game provides
migration from the large country to the smaller one. Also, there exists no interior
equilibrium with a positive ow of migrants from the smaller to the large country
whenever the smaller country has lower wages. Further, when migrants quit
low wage-large countries towards high wage-small countries, migration entails
3These ingredients of of the model are reminiscent of the well-known Tiebout model (1956)
designed to analyse the assignement of heterogeneous individuals among di¤erent jurisdictions
through local taxes. However, a major di¤erence between the two approaches is that, in our
model, individuals are at the start already assigned to a specic country when having to decide
to move or stay.
4See Marchiori et al (2012) and Beine and Parsons (2012) for climatic determinants of
international migration.
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a reduction in income tax in the small country but an increase in income tax
in the large country, as compared to the equilibrium in the benchmark. On
the contrary, when migrants quit high wage countries, whether large or small,
towards low wage countries, whether large or small, migration causes an increase
in income tax in the destination country but a decrease in income tax in the
large country, as compared with the benchmark.5
In summary, our paper provides a two-fold contribution to the existing liter-
ature. It contributes to the theory of labor migration, providing a setup where
individual choices to migrate from one country to another are aggregated and
simultaneously inuence their respective governments when deciding their level
of income tax. Using a stylized model to obtain a closed solution we identify
the equilibrium income taxes chosen by the governments and the size and di-
rection of migration ows between countries. Secondly, our paper contributes
to the asymmetric tax competition literature (Bucovestky, 1991, Kanbur and
Keen, 1993). We show that the benet of smallness can still hold in the case
of labor migration but depending on the productivity gap between countries.
Importantly, we show that migratory ows are directed towards large countries
who tax more than small countries when they own a certain level of productive
e¢ ciency.
Finally, notice that the approach provided in this paper allows to take into
account simultaneously the e¤ects of structural discrepancies among countries,
like size and productivity, on national income taxes when these countries are
engaged into scal competition.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the model is de-
tailed. Then, in Section 3, we characterize the equilibrium in the benchmark.
In Section 4, we analyze the equilibrium of the game when countries di¤er both
in the population size and productivity and compare the equilibrium with the
benchmark equilibrium. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Consider two asymmetric sized countries whose governments impose taxes on
income on their residents. The population in each country is uniformly dis-
tributed over types, and the set of types is represented in each country by the
[0; 1] interval. Each type of resident is supposed to be endowed with one unit
of labour sold on a (national) labour competitive market. In country i; labour
demand comes from a continuum of rms with an identical constant returns to
scale production function iz; i = h; f: Then, competitive wages wh and wf are
given by wh = H and wf = F .
Assume, without loss of generality, that the population is larger in country
H than in country F . Furthermore, assume that the two countries let freely
their residents to decide where to live after comparing the net income received
5 It is worth noting that this nding is in line with Razin (2012) where such a type of
migration e¤ect is discussed at length in terms of migrantsskills.
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in each country. We also suppose that the population is ranked each in the
unit interval [0; 1] according to the migration cost to be paid when moving
from ones own country to the other, assumed to be equal to x for individuals
of type x; x 2 [0; 1] :Thus, migration cost is the only source of heterogeneity
among the agents. We denote by ti i = h; f; the tax in country i, ti 2 [0; wi] :
Denote by l0; l0 2 (0; 1); the population density in the destination country and
1   l0 the population density in the origin country. The income tax revenue
of the government writes as (1   l0)ti in country i, and l0tj in country j; with
i 6= j; i = h; f; j = h; f .
We dene hereafter a game, with players consisting of the two governments
and the residents in both countries. The set of strategies for each government i;
i = h; f; is the set of taxes ti satisfying the constraint that ti 2 [0; wi]: As for the
residents in country i; the strategy set consists of two elements: stay in country
i; move to country j; with i 6= j: The payo¤s of this game are dened as follows.
Let ti be the strategy selected by Government i: Then, payo¤s of country i and
j are given by (1  l0)ti and l0tj ; respectively, with i 6= j; i = h; f; j = h; f . Now
consider the set of residents selecting the strategy stay in country i: Then, it
is easy to see that the set of residentstypes x in country i who have selected
strategy stay in country i is necessarily given by the interval [0; x] with x dened
by wi  ti = wj   tj   x: Those who have selected the strategy move to country
j are dened by the complementary interval ]x; 1] : It is clear that, in order to
obtain a non-null set of residents in i choosing the strategy move to country j;
it is necessary and su¢ cient that the value of x is strictly positive:
A Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies (ti ; t

j ) for the Governments, and
a strategy for each resident in each country such that no Government can uni-
laterally increase its payo¤ by selecting another strategy while no resident is
willing to move abroad (resp. to stay at home) when he has chosen to stay at
home (resp. to move abroad).
We rst identify the Nash equilibrium in a baseline where countries only
di¤er in size, while sharing the same productivity so that wi = wj : Then, we
move to characterize the equilibrium when country i is more productive than
country j so that wi > wj ; i 6= j; i = h; f; j = h; f .
3 The benchmark
Let us consider rst the scenario where both countries share the same technology,
namely wi = wj ; i 6= j: Migration takes place from the origin country i to the
destination country j; whose population before migration is l0:Notice that the
last citizens type x willing to leave from i to j; is given by  ti =  tj   x; or
x = ti   tj : (1)
Thus, a migration from i to j is possible at a Nash equilibrium (ti ; t

j ) if and
only if x(ti ; t

j ) > 0; with x(t

i ; t

j ) satisfying equation (1) : The resulting payo¤s
are given by
i(ti; tj) = ti (1  (1  l0)x  l0) and j(ti; tj) = tj (l0 + (1  l0)x) (2)
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Using (5), one can check that the second order conditions on i(ti; tj) are sat-
ised. As a consequence, using the rst order conditions, we easily obtain the
optimal taxes and the ow of migrants moving from i to j; namely,
tbi =
2  l0
3(1  l0) and t
b
j =
1 + l0
3(1  l0) (3)
and
x(ti ; t

j ) =
1  2l0
3(1  l0) : (4)
Notice that the equilibrium taxes imply a positive ow of migrants from i to j
if and only if the destination country is the smaller one, namely, l0 < 12 : Hence,
Proposition 1 When wi = wj ;the unique equilibrium of the tax game provides
migration from the large country to the smaller one, and is given by (3) and
(4). There exists no interior equilibrium with a positive ow of migrants from
the smaller to the larger country.
Since at equilibrium the smaller country selects lower income taxes and wages
are equal, it is immediate to conclude that the migration ows from the country
with the lower net income to the other one. At equal wages, the direction of
migration is fully determined by the relative level of taxes.
Now, we depart from the benchmark by assuming that countries enjoy dif-
ferent productivity so that their wages are no longer equal.
4 Di¤erent productivity (wages)
4.1 Destination country shows lower productivity: wi > wj
4.1.1 Equilibrium analysis
As in the benchmark case, let us again assume that migration takes place from
the origin country i to the destination country j: Notice that the last citizens
type x willing to leave from i to j; obtains as the solution x of the equation
wi   ti = wj   tj   x; or by
x = (ti   tj)  ( wi   wj): (5)
Thus, a migration from i to j is possible at equilibrium if and only if x(ti ; t

j ) >
0; with x(ti ; t

j ) now satisfying equation (5) : clearly, the size and direction
of migration now depends not only on the di¤erence between taxes, but also
on the di¤erence between productivity, or equivalently, between wages in the
two countries. The resulting payo¤s are given as in (2) : Using (5), one can
check that the second order conditions on i(ti; tj) are satised. Using the rst
order conditions, we easily obtain the candidate equilibrium strategies of the
Governments and the ow of migration as
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ti =
wi   wj
3
+
2  l0
3 (1  l0) and t

j =
wj   wi
3
+
1 + l0
3 (1  l0) ; (6)
and
x(ti ; t

j ) =
1
3

wj   wi + 1  2l0
1  l0

:
Notice that ti > 0 since wi > wj ; while t

j > 0 if
wj > wi   1 + l0
1  l0 : (7)
Taxes must not exceed wages: ti  wi and tj  wj ; which hold if and only if
wj > max

1 + l0
2 (1  l0)  
wi
2
;
2  l0
1  l0   2 wi

: (8)
Studying when x(ti ; t

j ) is positive; we observe that, if the destination country
j would be the larger country, H; namely if l0 > 1=2; then the ow of migration
from the origin country F to H would assume a negative value, which is not
admissible:Thus, we claim:
Proposition 2 When wi > wj ; there exists no interior equilibrium with a pos-
itive ow of migrants from the smaller to the larger country, when the latter has
a lower productivity.
It remains to study the sign of x(ti ; t

j ) provided that the destination coun-
try is the smaller country, namely l0 < 1=2: In this case, the condition that
guaranties both tj > 0 and x(t

i ; t

j ) > 0 writes as
wj > wi   1  2l0
1  l0 : (9)
Notice that each of the above conditions (8) and (9) determines a non empty set
in the domain of parameters ( wi; wj ; l0) : The set where a tax equilibrium lies
is identied by the solution of the system involving these conditions. Indeed,
condition (9) could imply a priori either wj > wi or the reverse, namely wj <
wi: However, the condition wj > wi is not compatible with the fact that the
destination country shows lower productivity ( wi > wj) and it will be treated
in the next section.
By construction, all residents in country i belonging to the interval

0; x(ti ; t

j )

are willing to move to country j; while all residents in the interval

x(ti ; t

j ); 1

are willing to stay in country i: Similarly, all residents in country j are willing
to stay in country j: Accordingly, as long as x(ti ; t

j ) > 0; the set of strategies
selected by all players corresponds to the unique equilibrium of the game with
migration from H to F . Thus, when the destination country j is the small
country F and the origin country is the larger country H, we state
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Proposition 3 When wi > wj, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium with
migration from the large to the small country if, and only if, conditions (8) and
(9) are satised. The equilibrium values th and t

f are given by
th =
2  l0
3 (1  l0) +
wh   wf
3
tf =
1 + l0
3 (1  l0)  
wh   wf
3
:
Furthermore, the migration ow obtains as
x(th; t

f ) =
1
3

wf   wh + 1  2l0
1  l0

:
Notice that tf < t

h: Thus, combining this inequality with wh > wf ; we
immediately deduce that, at equilibrium the net wage in the destination country
exceeds the net wage in the origin one. This explains why individuals ow
from the country H to country F : the destination country compensates its
lower productivity by taxing income to such an extent that the net wage in the
destination country exceeds the net wage in the origin country. This result is in
line with the existing literature on capital mobility (Bucovetsky, 1989, Wilson,
1986) and cross-border shopping (Kanbur and Keen, 1993). It is well-known
in this literature that small countries undercut in taxes their larger rivals to
benet from a higher elasticity of tax receipts. It turns out that this result also
holds true when labor is mobile and when the gross salary in the large country
is higher.
Some comparative statics on equilibrium taxes in country i; i = h; f; reveals
that equilibrium tax in country F negatively depends on the wage di¤erential
wh   wf : Further, equilibrium taxes in both countries depend positively on the
size of the destination country (@t

h
@l0
> 0 and
@tf
@l0
> 0)6 : Evidently, the higher the
wage gap, the lower the possibility for the destination country to tax in order
to increase the tax budget as the tax burden reduces the net wage and, as a
consequence, the incentive for migrants to ow into this country. Now consider
the e¤ect of size on equilibrium taxes. As we said above, when asymmetric sized
countries compete to attract mobile factors of production, like labor, then, the
smallest of the countries benets from its smallness, because this competition
leads to a race to the bottom (taxes being strategic complements). Therefore,
the higher l0, the less smaller country F (which is the country of destination of
migrants in Proposition 2). Consequently, the larger the country of destination,
the smaller the incentive to undercut taxes, and therefore the larger equilibrium
taxes.
6 It is important to understand that taxes do not depend directly on countriessize asym-
metry because taxes depend monotonically on l0; whereas size asymmetry decreases as l0
increases but stays below 1
2
; and then size asymmetry increases as l0 increases towards the
value 1. Notice also that
@th
@l0
> 0:
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Furthermore, the equilibrium migration ow fromH to F depends negatively
on the wage di¤erential wh   wf and on l0: The higher this wage di¤erential,
the lower the incentive for a resident in H to move towards F; the size of
this gap representing the intensity of repulsion for migrants to ow out from
country H: Further, the larger the population in F; the lower the possibility for
the Government in F to undercut, and thus, the smaller the ow of possible
migrants quitting H:
Finally, it is worth to point out the type of migration ows that arises
when there is no size asymmetry between countries, namely when l0 = 12 ; while
keeping di¤erent income levels. The candidate equilibrium taxes are then given
by
ti =
1
3
( wi   wj) + 1 tj =
1
3
( wj   wi) + 1: (10)
Nevertheless, the corresponding value of x(ti ; t

j ) is negative. Hence when
l0 = 1=2; the above pair of taxes (10) is not a Nash equilibrium. The intuition
for this result is as follows. As we know, taxes increase with the size of the
destination country l0; because as l0 gets closer to 1/2, tax competition to
attract migrants gets milder and milder. Hence, governments x taxes that are
increasing in l0; to the extent that if l0 reaches 1=2; then x < 0:Thus, when
l0 =
1
2 ; there is no tax equilibrium with a positive migration ow.
Corollary 4 When l0 = 12 ; there exists no interior equilibrium with a positive
ow of migrants in neither direction.
Notice that an equilibrium with migration from i to j cannot be simulta-
neously an equilibrium with migration from j to i: Indeed, the two intervals,
dened by (9) for the case in which the destination country has population l0
and by (8) for the case in which the destination country has population 1  l0;
are disjoint.
It remains to complete the analysis of the game when wi and wj lies in
the complementary sets delimited by (9) and (8). The candidate equilibrium
taxes strictly lying in this interval lead to x(ti ; t

j ) < 0: Thus, these candidate
equilibria cannot be equilibria because this would imply the existence of a non-
null set of types who would prefer to deviate from the strategy they choose at
the candidate equilibrium stay at home and select move abroad.
4.1.2 Equilibrium taxes: the benchmark case versus wages asymme-
try ( wi > wj)
In this section ,we study the e¤ects of migration on equilibrium taxes taking as
a benchmark the scenario in which the level of productivity among countries is
identical. To this aim, we need to compare taxes in (3) and in (6). From easy
computations, we nd that
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Proposition 5 When migrants quit large countries towards small countries,
migration causes a decrease in income tax in the large country but an increase
in income tax in the small country, as compared with the equilibrium tax in the
benchmark, when countries show the same level of wages.
When gross wages are di¤erent, migration mitigates the di¤erence in net
wages. Further, as the tax competition takes place between countries with
di¤erent wages, the race to the bottom phenomenon does no longer apply. In
fact, compared with the benchmark where countries share the same productivity,
countries react in the opposite way in their scal behavior: while the large
country reduces its scal burden at equilibrium, the small country increases its
income tax. Thus, it weakens the incentive for both countries to coordinate their
scal regimes, thereby preventing tax harmonization measures to be adopted.
4.2 Destination country shows higher productivity: wj >
wi
4.2.1 Equilibrium analysis
In this section, we analyze the scenario in which the destination country of
migration has a higher level of wages. The marginal consumer in country i who
is the last to be willing to move to j is again given as in (5): As before, the
resulting payo¤s for each government are given by (2) : Of course, equilibrium
values for taxes and migration ow are the same as in the above section, namely
ti =
wi   wj
3
+
2  l0
3 (1  l0) and t

j =
wj   wi
3
+
1 + l0
3 (1  l0) (11)
and
x(ti ; t

j ) =
1
3

wj   wi + 1  2l0
1  l0

:
Still, di¤erently from the above scenario in which wi > wj ; we have now wi < wj ;
so that x(ti ; t

j ) can now be positive for l0 smaller and/or larger than
1
2 . Hence,
by contrast with the above ndings, migration could take place from H to F , or
vice versa. Indeed, we check that tj > 0 for any value of the parameters, while
easy computations show that x(ti ; t

j ) > 0 and t

i > 0 if, and only if,
wi   1  2l0
1  l0 < wj <
2  l0
1  l0 + wi: (12)
Finally, wj > tj and wi > t

i if, and only if,
wj > max

1 + l0
2(1  l0)  
wi
2
;
2  l0
1  l0   2 wi

: (13)
However, it is easy to see that conditions (12) and (13) dene a nonempty set
of values of wj because max
n
1+l0
2(1 l0)   wi2 ; 2 l01 l0   2 wi
o
< 2 l01 l0 + wi: Thus, we
can conclude that
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Proposition 6 When wi < wj, there exist a unique equilibrium with migration
ow x(ti ; t

j ) from the less productive country to the most productive one if, and
only if, conditions (12) and (13) are met. The equilibrium values ti and t

j are
given by
ti =
wi   wj
3
+
2  l0
3 (1  l0) t

j =
wj   wi
3
+
1 + l0
3 (1  l0) ;
while the migration ow obtains as
x(ti ; t

j ) =
1
3

wj   wi + 1  2l0
1  l0

:
The di¤erence between equilibrium taxes in the destination and the origin
country is given by:
tj   ti = 2
wj   wi
3
  1  2l0
3 (1  l0)
Therefore, the sign of this di¤erence depends on whether the destination country
is larger or smaller than the origin country. Provided that wj > wi; if l0  1=2;
then tj   ti > 0: But if l0 < 1=2; then tj   ti > 0 as long as wj   wi > 1 2l02(1 l0) ;
whereas tj   ti < 0 if wi   wj < 1 2l02(1 l0) : It follows that
Corollary 7 When wi < wj ; a large country that is a destination country for
migrants taxes more than the small one. But a small country that is a desti-
nation country for migrants can tax more or less than the larger origin country
depending on the di¤erence of wi   wj :
This result departs from the existing literature on capital mobility (Bucov-
etsky, 1989, Wilson, 1986) and cross-border shopping (Kanbur and Keen, 1993).
As, we explained above, this literature highlights the benet of smallness: small
countries gain the competition for mobile capital because they undercut in taxes
their larger rivals taking advantage of a higher elasticity of tax receipts. It turns
out that this result does not always hold true when labor is mobile and when
the gross salary in the large country is higher than the gross salary paid in small
countries. Our result is reminiscent of the results obtained in some recent papers
on mobile capital as Justman et al, 2002, Zissimos and Wooders, 2010, Hindriks
et al, 2010, or Pieretti and Zanaj, 2011. In these papers, smaller countries can
x higher capital taxes than the larger countries as long as they supply a higher
level of public infrastructure that compensates for higher taxes. Similarly, in
our paper, we nd that a smaller country can x higher income taxes than a
larger one if it has a higher level of productivity.
4.2.2 Equilibrium taxes: the benchmark case versus wages asymme-
try ( wj > wi)
As in section (4.1.2), we analyze here the e¤ect of migration on taxes taking as
a benchmark the case in which wi = wj :
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Comparing taxes in (3) with (11), we nd
Proposition 8 When wj > wi and migration ows from low wage countries
towards high wage countries, it causes an increase in income tax in the desti-
nation country but a decrease in income tax in the origin country, as compared
with the equilibrium taxes in the benchmark.
This scenario recalls the result in Razin et al (2013), namely that migrants
may increase taxes in the destination country, and that this is why natives may
be against migratory ows. But in our paper the mechanism is di¤erent. We
identify two di¤erent drivers for migrants to move from an origin country to
a destination country. First, a high relative productivity e¢ ciency acts as a
powerful attractor, as it immediately a¤ects wages. Accordingly, the higher the
productivity in a country, the stronger the incentive for native-born citizens to
stay in this country and for those citizens living in the other country to migrate
there. Still, migration is also a¤ected by a second driver, namely income tax,
a relative high income tax acting as a repellent for migrants. As a result, the
migration ow observed between countries is dependent on the relative strength
of these drivers, the net income being the decision criterion for migrants when
selecting their strategy. So, a high productive country can set relatively high
income tax while still being attractive for migrants whenever the net income
resulting from its scal burden is larger than the one observed in the alternative
country.
5 Conclusion
In this theoretical paper, we have analyzed the optimal taxation set by two
countries with asymmetric population size and di¤erent productivity when res-
idents in each country can freely move from a country to another depending on
the net income corresponding to the optimal income taxes. Thanks to the sim-
plicity of the model, we were able to develop our analysis explicitly computing
the equilibrium values of the main variable at play: income taxes, and direction
and size of migrations ows. The parameters used to obtain this description are
the populationssizes and the productivity (wage) available in each of the two
countries. On one hand, the income tax values in each country mutually de-
pend on each other since their level modies the incentives to migrate between
them. On the other hand, the migration ow determines the optimal taxation
in each country. The equilibrium tax rates are then described in the whole set
of possible combinations of relative size and relative wage existing in each of
them.
The main restriction of our analysis consists in assuming that the govern-
ments maximize tax revenue, without explicitly describing what is done with
the resulting revenue and its resulting impact on consumerswelfare. This is the
object of our further research, in which we assume that the revenue collected is
used to produce a public good entering in the utility function of the consumers.
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Further, this model could be used to test whether its theoretical ndings are
indeed supported by the data. For instance, it could be interesting to analyze
how the data t the proposition 2 according to which no migration takes place
from a small country to a larger one, when the wage in the former is higher.
Countries like Luxemburg and Portugal, or Ireland and Poland, respectively,
could be used as examples for such empirical analysis.
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